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Abstract 
The ranking of MBA programmes by newspapers and magazines is common and usually 
contoversial. This paper discusses the use of the most popular method of making these 
rankings via a multicriteria model which uses the weighted sum of a number of performance 
measures to give an overall score on which selection or ranking may be based. The weights 
are a quantitative model of the preferences of those making the evaluation. Many methods are 
available to obtain weights from preference statements so that for any set of preferences a 
number of different weight sets can be found depending on the method used. Cognitive limits 
lead to inconsistency in preference judgements so that weights may be subject both to 
uncertainty and to bias. It is proposed that choosing weights to minimise discrimination 
between alternatives (not weights) guards against unjustified discrimination between 
alternatives.  
Applying the method to data collected by the Financial Times shows the effect of 
varying the level of discrimination between weights and also the effect of using a reduced 
data set made necessary by the partial publication of information. 
 
 
Keywords: multicriteria; quadratic programming; performance; MBA. 
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A Portfolio Model for Performance Assessment: the Financial Times MBA 
ranking. 
 
 
Introduction 
Measures of the performance of organisations are commonly used either to initiate some 
improving changes in the organisation or to provide a guide for those wishing to buy the 
goods or services produced by it. These evaluations are often presented, however unwisely, as 
rankings or league tables. This is a particular example of the general multicriteria problem of 
selecting a number of alternatives depending on their attributes. A commonly used method is 
to find for each alternative the weighted sum of a number of performance measures or 
attributes:  
 
 yi  =  wjuj(xij)                   (1) 
           
j 
 
where yi is the score of alternative i;  i = 1,2 n 
 xij  is the value of attribute j for alternative i;  j = 1,2 m 
 uj(.) is a value function chosen so that high values are preferred 
 wj   0 is the weight reflecting the importance of or preference for attribute j 
 
and, by convention, 
 
 wj = 1        (2) 
  
j 
 
where weights are chosen to encode the judgemental preferences of decision makers. 
In what follows the function chosen for uj(.) is the familiar z transformation 
 
 uj(xij)  = zij  =  (xij - j)/ j       (3) 
 
where j and j  are the mean and standard deviation of the values of X for attribute j. This 
form of value function may be preferred to simply rescaling data for each attribute to the 
range [0,1] because it is less sensitive to changes in the set of alternatives.  
In principle neither the data, X, nor the weights, W, are known precisely – the first 
because of errors of sampling and measurement and the second because of the inescapable 
imprecision imposed by the cognitive limits of those providing preference information. This 
paper describes a reaction to the second problem; uncertainty and bias in weight evaluations. 
It is to be understood that bias is not meant pejoratively but rather to indicate systematic error. 
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Given the cognitive and other difficulties which necessarily attend the elicitation of 
preference statements and which may lead to biased estimates (Borcherding, Schmeer and 
Weber 1995; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) it is customary to use some form of sensitivity 
testing to see if plausible variations in weight values might materially alter the result (see, for 
example, Barron and Schmidt, 1988; Mustajoki et al, 2006). Although these analyses provide 
an effective means of engagement of the user with the problem they do not reduce the 
desirability of formally incorporating into the structure of the evaluation model measures 
which reduce the effects of uncertainty and bias in the derivation of weights. The issue is one 
of justification. In particular, given some preference judgements the method whereby weights 
are found ought not to introduce any more information than is contained in those judgements. 
It is proposed that the variance of scores is an appropriate measure of discrimination and that 
the effect of information is to increase its value. 
Most evaluations receive no great publicity but of those that do the rankings which are 
routinely published of business schools and MBA programmes attract much attention. The 
data used by one of these, that provided by the Financial Times, is used here to demonstrate 
the derivation of minimally biased evaluations. 
The paper is organised as follows: a method for guarding against bias is proposed; 
following a brief discussion of MBA rankings and some of the issues which surround them 
the data used in this paper are given; finally, the method is applied and the results discussed. 
 
A portfolio model 
In making an evaluation weights are determined based on some preference information. It is 
usually the case that fitting weights to these judgemental data is a problem with positive 
degrees of freedom and so there exist no unique weights, only those which are optimal 
according to some criterion. In multicriteria analyses the motivation is often to maximise 
discrimination (e.g. Green and Doyle, 1995) by choosing weights which give maximum 
differences between scores. But is this right? 
The all too human desire to differentiate, to be decisive, can result in seeing differences 
where none are justified. Using methods which guard against this unjustified attribution of 
differences is therefore desirable. A similar concern arises in deciding probability 
distributions: that the probabilities are selected, unwittingly or not, in a way which biases the 
result towards a particular outcome. To guard against the effects of this bias Jaynes (1957) 
argued that a distribution should be sought which is minimally discriminating between the 
probabilities of alternative values of a variable. He did this by maximising the entropy of that 
distribution, - piln(pi), to give a distribution which is as flat as is consistent with any stated 
conditions which are to be respected. There remains the issue of just how such conditions (of 
mean and variance, for instance) are given: if firmly based on data there are no difficulties but 
 4 
if they are  to some degree subjective they may themselves be prone to bias. Jaynes (2003, 
p373) is quite clear on this; he believes that distributions may be found via the entropy 
maximising formalism only if conditions are specified as a result of what is known, not what 
is believed (he was no subjectivist). However, even if conditions are to some degree the result 
of judgement, the maximum entropy formalism does ensure that, given those conditions, the 
means whereby probabilities are subsequently derived induces no further bias.  
In multicriteria evaluation the task is to find weights rather than probabilities, but the 
same considerations hold (Jessop, 1999) and maximum entropy methods have been used to 
find weights by maximising the entropy of the weight distribution (Barron and Schmidt, 1988; 
Gabbert and Brown, 1989; Soofi, 1990; Soofi and Retzer, 1992) . The conditions imposed 
may be that it is desirable to have weights which are close to some initial distribution or that 
weights should stay within some stated bounds or both.  
The entropy of weights, - wiln(wi), is not the only measure of the flatness of a 
distribution, the variance,  
 
 w
2 
 =  ( wi²  -  1/m ) / m        (4) 
                
i  
 
being an obvious alternative. The sum wi², is a related measure used for the analysis of the 
concentration of market shares (Herfindahl OC, 1950; Hirschman, 1964) and of species 
diversity (Simpson, 1949). When the mean is unaltered by the distribution of weights, as here 
because of (3), optimising this index is effectively the same as optimising variance. Theil 
(1972) discusses some differences between the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and entropy. An 
example by Jessop (2004) of the application of both to a multicriteria problem shows that the 
results obtained are very similar (see also Breiman et al, 1998, ch 4). It is therefore 
reasonable to use variance as a measure of the flatness of a distribution and to minimise 
variance as a way of ensuring that weights contain no more information than is implicit in 
whatever constraints are set which encode the judgements of the decision maker. But first it is 
necessary to decide just what one should be minimally discriminating about. It perhaps seems 
too obvious to state that we wish to be minimally discriminating between attributes and so to 
choose a set of weights which reflects this. The flattest (most uniform) set of weights is one 
for which the variance (4) is minimised subject to (2) and any other constraints which encode 
statements of preference. With no such extra constraints this gives a uniform distribution of 
weights ( w
2 
 =  0).  
However, the purpose of the model is to assess the performance of alternatives and not 
to investigate weight distributions per se. Weights are a means to an end: it is the scores, Y, 
and the discrimination between alternatives which they permit, which are important and so we 
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wish to minimise the effects of unwanted biases in weight assessment inasmuch as they effect 
these scores. This is done by minimising the variance of the scores. The variance may be 
expressed to emphasise the underlying structure of the problem as  
 
 y
2
  =     wi wj ij                       (5) 
            
i     j 
 
where ij is the covariance between the values of uj(.) for pairs of attributes i and j ( ii = i
2
  is 
the variance of the attribute i). This is just the model for the estimation of portfolio risk due to 
Markowitz (1952) in which the weights are proportions invested in different stocks and the 
covariance matrix describes the relation between the returns from pairs of stocks. In a 
multicriteria model  the covariance describes the degree to which performance against 
different criteria are correlated. Because of (3) i
2
 = 1 and so (5) may be rewritten as 
 
                                             n-1       n 
 y
2
  =  wi²  +  2       wi wj ij                     (6) 
             
i                        i=1     j=i+1 
 
It is clear that when minimising y
2
 the resulting weights are a compromise between those 
needed to minimise the variance of the weight distribution and those which best exploit the 
structure in the data by using the covariances. If there is no structure in the performance 
matrix, X, the performance measured by one attribute is unrelated to performance measured 
by any other ( ij = 0; i j) so that  minimising y
2
 will be the same as minimising w
2
. This is 
unlikely.  
Given the importance which is often attached to published rankings of performance the 
attribution of differences is a matter of some practical moment, hence the need for well-
founded evaluations. The ranking of MBA programmes is a case in point. 
The various rankings and their importance both to business schools and their clients are 
outlined below. While the data gathered in these exercises are of value for the information 
they provide it is the aggregation of the data into rankings which receives the greater 
attention, as intended by the newspapers and magazines which publish them. Any such 
aggregation depends on decisions made about the relative importance of performance 
measures – weights – so that those schools not ranked as highly as they believe is their due 
see that the source of the perceived injustice is that the weights describe a set of values not 
shared by the school. This is inevitable if a single aggregate measure is to be constructed. But 
it is not the weights themselves but rather the discrimination implied by the rankings which is 
contentious and this raises two questions: first, why are results published ordinally as ranks 
(certainly in the example used in this paper) rather than as scores and, second, is the 
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difference in scores between any two schools large enough to justify the conclusion that one 
is inferior to the other, as different ranks do? About the first question one can only speculate 
that the motivation lies with the interests of the publisher. A partial response to the second 
question is that however the results are given it will help in their acceptance by schools and 
others if the scores are as fair as possible given the nature of the exercise and that part of this 
fairness is that the method should not unreasonably differentiate between schools. Using the 
portfolio model to minimise the variance of the scores does this. 
 
MBA rankings 
The performance of MBA programmes has been examined from the point of view of their 
relative strategic positions (Mar-Molinero and Mingers, 2007; Paucar-Caceres and Thorpe, 
2005; Segev et al, 1999) and their efficiencies as determined by frontier analyses such as 
DEA (Colbert, Levary and Shaner, 2000). However,  it is the published rankings which 
receive most attention, not least by business schools themselves. While it may be thought that 
business schools would welcome the publicity the very existence of the rankings  induces 
behaviours which may be unintended and, perhaps, undesirable (Policano, 2005). Although 
the evaluations are usually aimed just at MBA programmes applicants may use rankings as a 
proxy for reputation and prestige both of the programme and the school (Engwall, 2007).  
Siemens et al (2005) cite the findings of Dichev (1999) that there exists some 
unreliability in rankings which is likely to be due to errors in the data. Peters (2007), in 
summarising critiques of the ranking methodology, cites response rates from alumni, on 
which evaluations are based, as low as one percent. Such poor sampling undermines even 
those claims of data collection advanced in defence of rankings. Fortunately, the data used 
here are unlikely to be so flawed since the FT data are audited by KPMG, the only such data 
to be audited (Bradshaw, 2007).  
These are not trivial matters. For instance, Peters (2007) cites large increases in the 
number of applicants enjoyed by schools following improvements in their ranking. Other 
claims for rankings, for instance that they “are another important measure of customer 
satisfaction” (Thomas, 2007), also rely on defensible data collection and ranking 
methodology. Recognising the practical importance of published rankings Bickerstaffe and 
Ridgers (2007) give as one of the benefits that they have resulted in the accumulation of many 
data on which applicants and recruiters may in part base their decisions. The FT website 
provides the facility for the data to be used in just this sensible way.  
These and other current issues concerning business schools and rankings were 
examined in a recent issue of the Journal of Management Development (volume 26, no. 1, 
2007). 
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It should be borne in mind that any ranking reflects the view of the publisher and that 
this is articulated mainly in the choice of variables. For example, the MBA ranking provided 
by The Economist Intelligence Unit uses thirteen variables with a much greater emphasis on 
career support, networking opportunities and the like than the FT. The methodology is the 
same for both but the results quite different. It is not the case that one is superior to the other, 
just that they reflect different views. Similarly, with university rankings, those given by The 
Times, The Guardian and The Independent are concerned with UK universities and all include 
staff-student ratio, entry standards, some measure of expenditure per student and degree 
classification. They also have one or two measures of student satisfaction. The Higher, on the 
other hand, considers universities worldwide and uses six variables two of which, peer review 
and employer review, reflect constituencies of a very different kind than the usual relation 
between university and student. To the extent that these views may not be well founded the 
result is unreliable, although the views of peers may be useful to career academics when 
considering a job move and those of employers of more than passing interest to students. 
However well or ill founded the views of, say, employers may be they are their views and 
presumably condition the decisions made on recruitment. Provided that the data collection 
process is not flawed the user of the data (though not necessarily of the ranking) needs to be 
clear what variables are used and how important they are. It is not the case that because 
different rankings do not agree that their results are invalid, rather that one needs to be clear 
about what they measure. 
 
The data 
The ranking of the top 100 full-time MBA programmes worldwide published by the Financial 
Times on 29 January 2007 is used to illustrate the application of the portfolio model. Data 
were collected from each school and from a sample of its alumni. Performance was assessed 
using twenty attributes. Details of the measures used and the collection of data are given in 
the newspaper. Table 1 shows the attributes and, in column a, the weights which were used. 
Aggregation to obtain an overall score uses the method described above in (1) to (3).  
It is a peculiarity of the published tables that while data are provided for twelve 
attributes the remaining eight are given only as ranks. This makes it impossible to replicate 
the FT calculations. To make some use of the data either the ranks may be taken as real values 
or the eight ranked attributes may be omitted. There seems to be a small advantage in favour 
of the reduced set in that it is at least possible to have some confidence in the data used rather 
than having to misrepresent ordinal data. The purpose here is to use an illustration rather than 
to provide a detailed re-examination of the calculations made by the newspaper. Column b of 
Table 1 shows the weights for the reduced set scaled to sum to 1. 
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It is worth noting that using (3) means that the worse and best performing alternatives 
will generally have different scaled values for each attribute. This is shown in Figure 1. 
Extremely good performance is rewarded not just because it is the best of the group but 
because it is comparatively rare. For example, the programme with highest alumni salaries is 
scored more than twice as highly as that with the highest percentage of alumni employed at 
three months. There is an analogous penalty regime for particularly poor performance. 
 
Results 
Judgemental input can take the form of either ranges for weights or a preferred ordering or 
both. To illustrate the effects of imposing a preference ordering the FT scheme  
 
 w1,w2 > w3 > w4 , w5 > w6 > w7, w8,w9 w10,w11 > w12     (7) 
 
was used as a base. The required differentiation between the six groups of weights was 
specified by setting the minimum difference between weights as a fraction of the higher, (wi-
wj) > a.wi or 
 
 (1-a)wi - wj > 0          (8) 
 
where wi and wj are in adjacent groups in (7) and wi > wj. Using these sixteen constraints and 
(2) and minimising y
2
 using (5) and the covariances shown in the upper half of Table 2 gives 
a quadratic programme which finds a set of weights and thereby scores on which a ranking 
may be based. Values a=0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 were used. Three other models were calculated for 
comparison: that minimising y
2
 without weight constraints (8); uniform weights minimising 
w
2
; the FT weights shown in column b of Table 1. The results are shown in Tables 3 and 4 
and Figure 2.  It is notable that the weakly ordered weights and the FT weights (C to F) give 
highly correlated values of y and w (Figure 2), showing that requiring a greater 
differentiation between weights necessarily increases the spread of scores and so the 
differentiation between alternatives. In addition, as a increases the weights more closely 
resemble the FT weights (Table 4). The weights E derived when a=0.4 are very similar to 
those given by the FT, though this requirement is much less onerous than having to give point 
estimates for the weights. The weights within each group in (7) are the same although this 
was not a requirement; the constraints only specified the ordering with respect to weights in 
an adjacent group. 
Figure 3 shows distributions of scores for those models which minimise y
2
 and for the 
FT weights. Although the interquartile range does not change much the scores of the higher 
scoring schools become more attenuated as the weights are increasingly differentiated. The 
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distributions of attribute values generally exhibit some skew (Table 1, column c): attributes 3 
and 7 notably negative; 1, 4, 10, 11 and 12 notably positive. It might be expected that the 
aggregation to form an overall score would mean that score distributions tend to Normality. In 
general they do in that the skew is much reduced (Table 3) though it becomes increasingly 
positive as weights are more constrained. Although results C and D are not significantly 
different from Normal (Kolmogorov-Smirnoff and Shapiro-Wilk tests with 5% significance 
level) the others are. Figure 4 shows an example. Weights increasingly favour the two 
variables describing alumni income, both of which have a positive skew, so that the 
distribution of scores itself shows increasingly positive skew.  
The extreme outlier at the low end of the rankings in C to E is much less pronounced 
with the FT weights F. This outlier is the programme with the extremely low z value of -6.8 
for attribute 3 (Figure 1). Comparing the E and F weights (Table 4) shows similar values for 
all except w3, which is only half the value in F that it is in E. This accounts for the improved 
performance. 
Table 5 shows the top ten programmes in all six evaluations. Of those evaluations with 
weight constraints (C to F) seven programmes appear in all four lists. It would seem that 
introducing just a little preference information gives a base structure to the evaluation which 
does not change that much as the constraints become more prescriptive. This is also shown by 
the correlations in Table 6. The correlation between the equal weights and FT weights (A and 
F) is particularly poor. Policano (2007) found this same result in his analysis of the US News 
ranking. The correlations between the base model, min y
2
, with no weight constraints (B) and 
other models are poor. It is not surprising that results with an increasingly sharp articulation 
of a preference structure should be dissimilar to that with none. The value of B is that it 
establishes an unconstrained minimum for y
2
 against which others may be compared. 
 
A comment on the 2008 data 
The rankings for 2008 were published on January 28th. The resulting correlations are shown 
in the lower half of Table 2. A full comparison with the 2007 data  is not possible because 
variable 6, aims achieved, was given as a rank rather than a percentage and so correlations 
with this variable cannot be calculated. This treatment is odd; aims achieved  was also given 
as a rank in 2003 and 2004 but not before then nor between 2005 and 2007. In 2001 only six 
of the twenty variables were given indirectly (as scaled indices rather than ranks) whereas 
now it is nine. It would be interesting to know why this is so. 
Although calculations similar to those for 2007 are not possible it can be seen from (6) 
that if the covariances (and so correlations) are not dissimilar neither will be the resulting 
value of y
2
. Figure 5 shows a graphical comparison from which it can be seen that the 
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structural relations between variables have not changed much and so neither would the result 
be expected to change much either. 
 
Clusters and gaps 
The purpose of an analysis is to determine which programmes have performance levels 
similar to that of others: scores have value only inasmuch as they distinguish between 
alternatives. A ranking is just an extreme application of this idea. Making these distinctions is 
difficult for two reasons. First, because the model (1) reduces a multidimensional description 
of each alternative to a single figure, the score. Had this not been done some form of cluster 
analysis would find groups of programmes which had similar form, similar profiles of 
performance across their vectors of attributes. Second, had the uncertainty due to sampling or 
due to weight specification or both been described statistically then the resulting probabilistic 
estimate of each score could be expressed as a confidence interval and statistically significant 
differences between scores found. Groups of statistically similar alternatives might then be 
formed, though the result  may be just a set of overlapping confidence intervals (The Royal 
Statistical Society, 2003) rather than clusters. This would still make it possible to say, for 
instance, that an alternative ranked fifth has a score significantly different from that ranked 
thirty fifth even though it is not possible to differentiate between alternatives which are 
adjacent or close. This is an important idea. 
Although neither approach is used in published rankings, the inability perfectly to 
discriminate is recognised. For example, the FT, in its ranking, identifies four groups: 16 in 
the topmost group and then groups of 16, 21 and 47. (It has to be said that these groupings are 
not apparent in the analyses here and so must depend on the variables which were excluded 
from this analysis.) Given that the distribution of scores is a positively skewed continuum 
(hence the increasing size of the groups) it is unsurprising that the differences between 
programmes in the low density tail tend to be greater than those in the higher density body, 
but to say that these larger differences are significant or remarkable leads to an inconsistency. 
For example,  in the FT rankings it must surely be the case that the gap in scores between, 
say, the  programmes ranked 60 and 80 is at least as big as that between the programmes 
ranked 53 and 54, yet the latter gap is seen as in some sense significant while programmes 60 
and 80 are part of an undifferentiated group. The argument – that if neighbours in a chain 
cannot be differentiated then no two members of the chain can be differentiated – is 
reminiscent of an incremental reasoning with roots in antiquity (see, for instance, Barnes, 
1982). It is an argument which is hard to support.  
MBA rankings will remain. They appear simple and many find them useful. The 
purpose here was not to examine rankings but only to describe a method which could be of 
use in finding the weights which they, and others, might use. 
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Conclusion 
This paper is concerned with finding a set of weights which are a justifiable articulation of the 
judgements implicit in making a ranking. Taking the broadly statistical view of the portfolio 
model shows clearly the relation between the information contained in the weights and in the 
scores on which ranks are based. Given the imprecision inherent in any expression of 
preference it is important to guard against undue discrimination between alternatives. It is this 
focus on results (scores) rather than on the weights themselves which is the basis of this 
method. 
Weights are seen as expressions of priority so that, at least, a rank ordering of weights 
is possible. Using this as a constraint in an optimisation which enforces caution reconciles 
apparently conflicting requirements: to be opinionated and yet to reach minimally biased 
conclusions.  
It is the rank order of weights and the relative differences between them which largely 
determine the result. As Table 4 shows, the greater this relative difference the more the 
minimally discriminating weights resemble the FT weights. Even so, the results obtained 
(Table 5) are different from those found by the FT. The ranking of the top ten using the 
reduced data set but FT weights (result set F) contains eight of the FT top ten, but even using 
a small relative difference between weights (C) it contains six. It is the information contained 
in the unrecoverable eight variables that makes the difference. 
It is usual (though not in published rankings) that weights may be altered in a 
sensitivity analysis to see the effects of  imprecision and whether plausible differences in 
weights have a large effect. It would certainly be helpful if some such results could be 
published so that real differences in performance could reliably be identified. In recognition 
of the problem most publications contain some statement to the effect that differences 
between scores may not be significant. Further analysis would, of course, undermine the 
existing simple ranking and it is easy to see why newspapers and magazines would not find 
this helpful.  
The success of the multicriteria model is due in part to its modularity. This enables 
users to consider sub-problems rather than the whole so that the elicitation of weights is a task 
the results of which are used in computing scores. In this framework weights may assume an 
unnecessary importance. Finding weights which minimise the variance of scores goes some 
way to reintegrating the modular framework. The same set of judgemental constraints will 
give different weights with a different problem. This seems odd only if the weights 
themselves are invested with a significance other than their role of encoding judgements: it is 
the judgements themselves and the results which are key. In particular, the problem provides 
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the context in which the judgements are articulated as numbers: changing the context will 
change the numbers while retaining the judgements. 
Evaluations must be believed, at least to the extent that they act as a guide. Using a 
method which minimises the effects of bias helps to justify the analysis. The consumer of the 
results ought to be reassured that the method of calculation does not itself contribute to 
apparently significant (important, at least) results but rather that all the information contained 
in the scores is a function of preference statements and data and nothing else.   
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Figure 1. Distributions of attributes. For each attribute the thicker line shows the spread of the 
middle 50 values, the thinner line the middle 90, and the circles the highest and lowest five 
values. The vertical line shows the median. 
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Figure 2.  Standard deviations of scores and weights (see Table 3). 
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Figure 3. Distributions of scores. Dashed lines join the quartiles. 
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Figure 4. Comparison of E scores with Normal distribution. 
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Figure 5. Correlations in 2007 and 2008. The diagonal line shows equal values. The box 
shows correlations insignificant (p 0.05) in both years. 
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  FT weights   
 attribute full set subset   skew 
  a b  c 
1 Weighted salary (US$’000) 0.20 0.299  1.02 
2 Salary increase(%) 0.20 0.299  0.27 
3 Faculty with doctorates (%) 0.05 0.075  -3.67 
4 International faculty (%) 0.04 0.060  1.17 
5 International students (%) 0.04 0.060  0.65 
6 Aims achieved (%) 0.03 0.045  -0.80 
7 Employed at three months (%) 0.02 0.030  -2.64 
8 Women faculty (%) 0.02 0.030  0.23 
9 Women students (%) 0.02 0.030  -0.19 
10 International board (%) 0.02 0.030  1.17 
11 Languages (number) 0.02 0.030  2.60 
12 Women board (%) 0.01 0.015  1.50 
      
13 FT research rank 0.10    
14 International mobility rank 0.06    
15 FT doctoral rank 0.05    
16 Value for money rank 0.03    
17 Career progress rank 0.03    
18 Placement success rank 0.02    
19 Alumni recommend rank 0.02    
20 International experience rank 0.02    
  1.00 1.000   
 
Table 1.  The FT data: variables and weights.      
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1  0.29 0.23 0.28 -0.05 0.58 0.18 -0.35 -0.02 0.25 0.15 -0.05 
2 0.31  0.13 -0.21 -0.24 0.46 0.15 -0.11 -0.08 0.04 0.10 -0.13 
3 0.28 -0.14  0.13 -0.21 0.31 0.13 -0.22 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.19 
4 0.27 -0.09 0.27  0.55 -0.05 0.06 -0.21 -0.09 0.57 0.35 0.11 
5 -0.02 -0.12 0.00 0.55  -0.24 -0.14 0.05 0.00 0.59 0.43 0.21 
6       0.16 -0.16 -0.09 -0.05 0.02 -0.16 
7 0.15 0.09 0.02 -0.08 -0.11   -0.17 -0.29 -0.01 0.05 -0.08 
8 -0.35 -0.30 -0.06 -0.17 0.17  -0.09  0.33 -0.17 -0.08 0.27 
9 -0.02 0.02 -0.14 -0.10 -0.16  -0.04 0.21  -0.04 -0.14 0.10 
10 0.20 0.11 0.04 0.45 0.57  0.09 -0.03 0.01  0.55 0.14 
11 0.16 0.22 -0.10 0.34 0.36  -0.13 -0.14 -0.11 0.50  0.03 
12 -0.06 -0.06 -0.11 0.21 0.28  0.04 0.17 0.04 0.18 0.03  
 
 
Table 2.  Correlation matrix for attributes. Significant values (p 0.05) shown in bold. 
    Upper half shows correlations in 2007, lower half in 2008. 
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 standard deviations  skew 
objective w y   
A min. w
2
: equal weights 0.000 0.370  0.35 
B min y
2
: no weight restrictions 0.044 0.327  -0.23 
C min y
2
: a=0.2 0.033 0.405  0.48 
D min y
2
: a=0.3 0.053 0.441  0.54 
E min y
2
: a=0.4 0.075 0.490  0.61 
F FT weights 0.098 0.545  0.77 
 
 
Table 3. Results of weight & score determinations showing standard deviations of 
distributions and also the skew of the distributions of scores (see Figure 2). 
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weights C D E F 
w1,w2 0.144 0.185 0.235 0.299 
w3 0.115 0.130 0.141 0.075 
w4 , w5 0.092 0.091 0.084 0.060 
w6 0.073 0.064 0.051 0.045 
w7, w8,w9 w10,w11 0.059 0.045 0.030 0.030 
w12 0.047 0.031 0.018 0.015 
 
Table 4. Weights. 
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rank A B C D E F 
1 12 12 12 11 11 11 
2 5 36 5 5 2 2 
3 13 9 13 2 1 1 
4 7 5 11 1 5 10 
5 15 28 7 12 4 4 
6 11 15 1 13 12 12 
7 1 42 2 4 10 9 
8 36 3 15 7 13 5 
9 3 51 4 10 9 6 
10 24 10 9 9 7 8 
 
 
 
Table 5. MBA programmes ranked 1 to 10 under different weight specifications. The 
identifying numbers in the table show the position in the FT published list. 
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 A B C D E F 
A  0.912 0.953 0.894 0.820 0.753 
B 0.887  0.810 0.743 0.667 0.600 
C 0.955 0.854  0.987 0.953 0.867 
D 0.898 0.789 0.985  0.989 0.924 
E 0.803 0.690 0.935 0.978  0.970 
F 0.723 0.609 0.901 0.951 0.980  
 
 
Table 6. Correlation between scores obtained in six evaluations. The upper matrix shows 
Pearson’s correlation and the lower Spearman’s rank correlation. 
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Captions 
 
Figure 1. Distributions of attributes. For each attribute the thicker line shows the spread of the 
middle 50 values, the thinner line the middle 90, and the circles the highest and lowest five 
values. The vertical line shows the median. 
Figure 2.  Standard deviations of scores and weights (see Table 3). 
Figure 3. Distributions of scores. Dashed lines join the quartiles. 
Figure 4. Comparison of E scores with Normal distribution. 
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